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Winston Cheung
Senior Seminar

Hedge fund activism and short term price impacts: from the perspective of hedge
funds
Introduction
Hedge fund activism has been attracting more attention nowadays. On the 14th of March,
2016, two democratic senators introduced a bill “that would take aim at activist hedge funds and
their ability to act together in “wolf packs” to overtake public companies” (Moyer, 2016). On 4th
of April, 2016, the U.S. sues ValueAct, which is an activist hedge fund, by saying that “[it]
violated Antitrust Law” (Picker, 2016). These are just few of the evidence showing that hedge
fund activism is attracting more attention in both the financial and political realm nowadays.
Hedge fund activism, defined as hedge funds using their large unregulated pool of capital to take
on substantial stakes, usually over 5%, on publicly traded companies, while implementing
changes to the way the target firms in hope of making the target firms more valuable in many
ways. The existing literature reviews that there is a large bodies of studies that is devoted to
finding or disproving the long-term benefits that activist hedge funds bring to the target firms.
The proponents of hedge fund activism argue that hedge funds are good catalysts that bring
changes to the target firms that are both beneficial to the short run and the long run. However,
the opponents of hedge fund activism rebut by saying that the econometric analysis that
proponents performed in order to show the long term benefits is fundamentally flawed and that
the econometric analysis does not provide meaningful information about the benefits that such
activities bring in the long run. Whether hedge fund activism does create value in the long run is
still an on-going debate.
Given the context of hedge fund activism, this paper aims to investigate the short-term
price impacts that hedge funds induce on target firms, and subsequently examine what are the
determinants that drive the short-term price impacts, assuming there is positive price shock. The
latter part of the study is considered to be novel to this study as many existing literature are not
concerned with what drives the price shocks, or the cumulative abnormal returns.
Literature Review
The following is an extensive literature review on the existing literature by many scholars
on the topic of hedge fund activism. But before diving into the crux of this literature review,
which is to understand the ongoing debate for and against hedge fund activism, it is imperative to
first understand what hedge funds really are, and how they are different from other financial
intermediaries. Hedge funds are often misunderstood in many ways and taken as just another
alternative investment vehicles for investors to diversify their own portfolios. It is thereby
important to first address the differences hedge funds and other financial intermediaries have.
I. What are hedge funds? How are they different from other financial intermediaries?
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Hedge fund is a type of pooled funds investment vehicle that uses unconventional
strategies like derivatives and leverage to achieve active return, usually referred to as alpha, 1 for
investors. Over the past two decades, hedge fund remains to be one of the fastest growing
alternative investment vehicles in the global financial arena. In 1990, hedge funds had around 39
billion in assets (Getmansky, Lee, Lo, 2015). Despite all the financial crises that took place in
the course of the two decades, the hedge fund asset class ballooned to around $2.5 trillion
(Getmansky, Lee, Lo, 2015).
Unlike other traditional investments, alternative investment vehicles like hedge funds
remain to be somewhat unregulated in the financial market, which gives hedge fund managers
more flexibility in terms of the means to invest to achieve active return. While “unregulated”
may be a popular word to describe hedge funds, Connor and Woo (2004, p. 8) describe it as
hedge funds structuring themselves in a way to “[take] advantage of exemptions in regulations.”
Hedge funds are different. Even though there is a significant increase in hedge fund
activities in the global financial market for the past two decades or so, there remains to be no
universal definition of what a hedge fund really is. This certainly underscores the nontransparent nature of hedge funds which will be discussed further later on in this section. A
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) roundtable took place in 2003 and there were
fourteen possible definitions of what a hedge fund is (Vaughan, 2003). Summarizing all the
comments from the roundtable, Brav, Jiang, and Thomas concluded that there are four defining
characteristics of a hedge fund. The four characteristics are as follow:
“ (1) they are pooled, privately organized investment vehicles; (2) they are
administered by professional investment managers with performance-based
compensation and significant investments in the fund; (3) they are not widely
available to the public; and (4) they operate outside of securities regulation and
registration requirements. More specifically, hedge funds avoid the Investment
Company Act of 1940 by having a relatively small number of sophisticated
investors” (Brav, Jiang, & Thomas, 2008, p. 1735).
Other financial intermediaries like mutual funds and pension funds are bounded by
relatively more strict regulations that were enacted under the Investment Company Act of 1940
(Hedge Fund Law Blog). However, hedge funds do not fall into the Investment Company Act’s
definition of an investment company, which means they are able to make certain investment
decisions that are otherwise considered risky or non-prudent from a traditional investment
standpoint. To better illustrate this point, I should provide few of the many examples of how
hedge funds are different from other financial intermediaries like mutual funds. First, as hedge
funds are not subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) regulations,
they are able to hold highly concentrated positions in companies (Brav, Jiang & Thomas, 2008).
While portfolio diversification is one of the priorities for mutual funds due to tax laws, hedge
funds can operate on high concentration risk in their portfolio to achieve their investment

1

Alpha is a commonly used measure to gauge an investment’s performance on a risk-adjusted basis. It is the excess
returns of the investment in relation to the underlying benchmark. It is often times a better way to gauge the socalled excess returns of an investment
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objectives. Second, hedge funds are not constrained by the same liquidity requirements that
mutual funds have (Clifford, 2008).
Mutual funds are legally required to have sufficient amount of liquidity in their portfolio
in the event of redemption requests from the fund’s shareholders (Clifford, 2008; Brav, Jiang &
Thomas, 2008). Hedge fund managers, on the other hand, are able to exercise their right to lockup investors’ investment capital “for a period of 2 years or longer” and that hedge fund managers
require their investors to inform them well ahead of time if they are going to withdraw their
capital from the hedge fund (Brav, Jiang & Thomas, 2008).
The Investment Company Act of 1940 also limits pension and mutual funds managers to
reward themselves with “direct performance-based compensation when compared to that of
hedge fund managers” (Clifford, 2008, p. 325). On the other hand, hedge fund managers are
able to reward themselves with the risk they take by direct performance-based compensation or
incentive fee, as many would call it. Typical hedge funds follow the 2-20 rule. They charge
their investors 2% as a management fee and 20% on the hedge funds’ annualized excess returns
(Clifford, 2008). The direct performance-based fee incentivizes hedge fund managers in a way
that is very different than that of mutual or pension fund managers (Brav, Jiang & Thomas,
2008). Brav, Jiang, and Thomas (2008) also point out one fundamental difference that sets
hedge funds apart from other investment vehicles is that “hedge funds do not sell products to the
firms whose shares they hold.” This results hedge funds to avoid any sort of conflicts of interest
because the investments that hedge funds make are purely for the gains of the managers and the
hedge fund itself.
It is also important to distinguish hedge funds from other of similar traits financial
intermediaries like private equity and venture capitals. While private equity and venture capitals
have fundamental differences in their purposes they serve, private equity and venture capitals
focus on the private capital market while hedge funds focus on the public equity market (Brav,
Jiang & Thomas, 2008). Due to the unique structure and nature of hedge funds, many legal
scholars, including Clifford, argue that “hedge funds may have better incentives to monitor a
firm’s management and board than previously studied financial intermediaries” (Clifford, 2008).
II. What is shareholder activism? What is hedge fund activism?
Hedge funds, nowadays, can be separated into four main categories, namely equity,
event-driven, relative value, and macro hedge. Activist hedge fund falls into the even-driven
subcategory. In particular, a report, published by J.P. Morgan Corporate Finance Advisory,
suggests that “no recent development has influenced firms’ strategic and financial decisionmaking as profoundly as the surge in shareholder activism following the global financial crisis”
(Zenner et al., 2015, p. 1). Having said that, shareholder activism is nothing new in the financial
sector. In fact, the “closest ancestors to hedge fund activists” can be traced back to the 1980s
when activist shareholders targeted poorly performing companies and invest in them which
resulted in improvements in shareholder value and profitability (Brav, Jiang, & Thomas, 2008).
There has been a steady surge of shareholder activism for the past decade. The surge is
even more pronounced ever since the global financial crisis in 2008. The J.P. Morgan report
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shows that there were less than $12 billion of assets under management (AUM) in the activist
asset class. It has now grown into an asset class with more than $112 billion in assets (Zenner et
al., 2015). Further, the authors of the J.P. Morgan report identify few of the main drivers of the
growth in this activist asset class. They include, but not limited to, the low interest rate
environment, lazy balance sheets and low returns in the fixed-income markets (Zenner et al.,
2015). The aftermath of the global financial crisis has perhaps resulted in investors seeking for
an alternative investment vehicle for higher returns, which explains the surge in this particular
asset class since the crisis.
In the broader sense, activism “represents a range of activities by one or more of a
publicly traded corporation’s shareholders that are intended to result in some change in the
corporation” (Shareholder Activism: Who, What, When, and How?, 2015). In particular, hedge
fund activism is what Cloyd (2015) refers to as the asset class that is at “the most assertive end of
the spectrum” (Shareholder Activism, 2015). Hedge funds will utilize their large, unregulated
pool of capital from several wealthy investors to acquire a significant stake in different
companies, often referred to as target firms, in order to implement changes in those target firms
in hopes of generating excess returns, or alpha as previously mentioned. The specific tactics that
different activist hedge funds to implement changes vary, but the common tactics that hedge
funds managers use “fall within the category of capital allocation strategy” (Shareholder
Activism, 2015).
One important question remains unanswered is why target firms became target firms in
the first place. Activist hedge funds generally do not target well-performing companies just
because its more challenging that way to bring about a change in the company in order to result
in a significant increase in the shareholder value. We can therefore say that activist hedge funds
target under-performing and inefficient companies. The J.P. Morgan specifically presents five
common themes of why companies get targeted by hedge funds in the first place. They are
namely, underperformance, poor capital allocation and lack of corporate clarity, corporate
control, and governance (Zenner et al., 2015). Typical target firms do embody some, or all, of
the traits mentioned above. The key takeaway is that activist hedge funds target firms with poor
performance with very “lazy” balance sheets, meaning they have “excess cash, unused debt
capacity, and non-core assets” (Zenner, Gosebruch, Berkovitz, 2010, p. 4).
III. How do hedge funds actively engage in a target firm?
Depending on the context of the literature and the purpose of different empirical studies,
the exact definition of hedge fund activism may vary. For the purpose of this literature review, a
hedge fund is considered to be active whenever the hedge fund has accumulated, in total, more
than 5% of the target firm. The threshold of 5% is more than just a random number. In fact, it is
required by law by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that whenever “a person or
group of persons acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a voting class of a
company’s equity securities,” that person or group of persons are required to file the Schedule
13D with the SEC within the ten days after the hedge funds have reached that 5% threshold
(SEC). Beneficial ownership is an important jargon for the definition of activism because it
means that the person or group of persons “has the power to vote or influence the transaction
decisions regarding a specific security” (Investopedia, 2016). Also, Schedule 13D is unique in a
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way because the filing of a 13D means that the hedge fund(s) has the intention to actively engage
in the target firm in different ways. The purpose of the transaction is explicitly laid out under the
Item 4, which is the Purpose of Transaction, in the Schedule 13D. I have retrieved a schedule
13D filed by Atlantic Investment Management, Inc. from the SEC EDGAR 2 database to
illustrate the unique nature of the 13D. Atlantic Investment Management, Inc., has accumulated
5.1% of the company Oil States International, Inc. as of the 1st of December, 2014. Under the
Item 4, it states that Atlantic Investment Management, Inc., aims to “[pursue] an investment
objective that seeks capital appreciation” (SEC 13D, CUSIP Number: 678026105).
While the Schedule 13D is considered to be the definitive evidence of hedge fund
activism across all literature, since hedge funds are very non-transparent and secretive of what
they actually do, Schedule 13G does reveal a subset of activism data. Very similar to Schedule
13D, an investor or a group of investors are legally required to file the Schedule 13G whenever
they have accumulate more than 5% of the company. However, one important caveat that
pertains to the Schedule 13G is that it does not indicate that the investor(s) is trying to actively
engage in a target firm. Instead, it means the opposite. Schedule 13G indicates that the
investor(s) does not have the intention to exert any kind of control or influence in the company at
all. The accumulation of 5% or more simply serves as an investment purpose, which is
oftentimes considered as passive investment rather than active (Clifford, 2008, 326).
IV. Proponents and Opponents of Hedge Fund activism
For such secretive, and seemingly non risk-averse financial intermediary to actively
engage in many companies and implement changes is something that has been attracting more
attention and scrutiny nowadays. Not only are people more conscious of the risk the financial
market is bearing ever since the global financial crisis in 2008, there is also huge policy
implications as to how policymakers will try to monitor and exert more control on these highly
non-transparent and unregulated financial activities. For the following section in this literature
review, I will be presenting the two prevailing arguments, both for and against, pertaining to
hedge fund activism.
IV(A). Proponents of Hedge Fund Activism
One of the most recognized and extensive empirical studies in the field regarding hedge
fund activism is the paper “The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism,” which is written
by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang. They are amongst the more active scholars
out there who feel very strongly about the positive long-term effects that hedge fund activism
brings to shareholders. In this study, they conduct a systematic empirical investigation on the
claim that activist hedge funds are “myopic-activist,” meaning activist hedge funds are very
near-sighted.
At this juncture, a brief overview of the other side of the argument, which is against
hedge fund activism, seems to be in order. The claim that activist hedge funds are myopic agents
are based on the premise that the activist interventions by hedge funds have a value-decreasing
2

SEC EDGAR stands for SEC Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval. It is a massive database under
the SEC for the public to retrieve more than 20 million filings across the U.S.
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instead of value-increasing effect to the target firms in the long-term even though target firms
experience positive increase in market valuations in the short term (Bebchuk, Brav, & Jiang,
2015). In line with this myopic-activist claim, William George, a Harvard Business School
professor and a director at Goldman Sachs asserts that “activists cloak their demands in the
language of long-term actions, their real goal is a short-term bump in the stock price. They
lobby publicly for significant structural changes, hoping to drive up the share price and book
quick profits. Then they bail out, leaving corporate management to clean up the mess”
(“Activists Seek Short-Term Gain,” 2013).
Given the brief overview of the opposing view of hedge fund activism, Bebchuk, Brav,
and Jiang conduct analysis using a dataset, which comprises of 2,040 Schedule 13D filings
between 1994 to 2007. The key focus of this study, like many others, is whether the
interventions will lead to change in the target firms’ operating performance. The two metrics
that the authors use to gauge the change in operating performance are return on assets (ROA) and
Tobin’s Q, or simply the Q Ratio. Their key findings from the 2,040 activist interventions are as
follow. First, they find no evidence that short-term gains come at the expense of “subsequent
long-term declines in operating performance” (Bebchuk, Brav, & Jiang, 2015, p. 1117). In fact,
each year after the intervention, up to five years, the operating performance of target firms
experienced improvements, which are statistically significant. Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang further
their investigation by addressing critics’ stock-picking argument. Simply put, the stock-picking
argument follows the logic that hedge funds are not actually improving the operating
performance of target firms but merely choosing targets that are expected to improve with or
without the intervention (Bebchuk, Brav, & Jiang, 2015). Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang address this
argument by stating that this investigation is not to find the causal link between hedge fund
activism and positive long-term effects on target firms but that it is to empirically test whether
short-term gains are followed by long-term operating performance declines is at all substantial.
The findings in the Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang’s piece are in many ways consistent with
other literature as well. Another empirical study, “The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism:
Productivity Asset Allocation, and Industry Concentration,” written by Alon Brav, Wei Jiang,
and Hyunseob Kim, investigates yet and again the long-term effects of hedge fund activism.
However, this study is different in a way that the authors investigate the long-term effects by
focusing on the productivity of target firms using plant-level information. Instead of using firmlevel information to gauge the effects of activism, which is what the authors of the previous
study did, using data from manufacturing plants owned by target firms will help eliminate the
effects of survivorship bias 3. The findings from this empirical study is generally consistent with
the one conducted by Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang in the sense that there is long-term
improvements in operating performance in target firms several years after the intervention (Brav,
Jiang, & Kim, 2013). The authors of this study also investigate the effects of product market
concentration on activism, which has not been done in the previous study. By using the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to gauge the market product concentration of different
industries, the authors find that the improvement of total factor productivity (TFP) in the
3

A lot of the commonly used databases, like Compustat, do not include data of target firms when other competitors
either acquire them or they are simply not in business. This has been a big confounding factor to many other studies
as the true post-intervention operating performance of target firms cannot be studied thoroughly, contributing to the
survivorship bias.
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manufacturing plants, owned by target firms, is more significant in the less concentrated
industries (Brav, Jiang, & Kim, 2013). This is due to the fact that highly concentrated industries
face relatively inelastic demand curves which result in less gains from the increase in the
productivity of the manufacturing plants (Brav, Jiang, and Kim, 2013, p. 14). Overall, the results
show very positive effects of hedge fund activism and that it “facilitates improvements in terms
of both production efficiency of assets-in-place and capital reallocation” (Brav, Jiang, & Kim,
2013, p. 27).
The empirical study done by Christopher P. Clifford, “Value creation or destruction?
Hedge funds as shareholder activists?,” follows the similar route similar to the Bebchuk, Brav,
and Jiang’s empirical study, which is to examine the long-term effects of hedge fund activism on
target firms. However, there are few fundamental differences in this study that is worth noting.
As the previous studies focus on analyzing the effects using the Schedule 13D as the dataset,
Clifford also includes a control group that comprises of the Schedule 13G. The inclusion of a
control group of Schedule 13G is to help “isolate the effects of shareholder activism, insofar as
selection ability is the same across filing types” (Clifford, 2008, p. 324). There are several key
findings I wish to highlight. First, Clifford finds that there is a high level of specialization in a
specific industry when hedge funds decide to actively engage in target firms. Clifford finds that
there is approximately 21% of the hedge funds in his sample focus in only one industry (Clifford,
2008, p. 327). This implies that the choice of target firms is highly dependent on the expertise of
the hedge fund managers. Second, Clifford finds no substantial evidence to back the argument
that activist hedge funds “raid” target firms cash (Clifford, 2008). With the 13G as the control
group, Clifford’s findings are particularly meaningful when he looks at the short-term price
impacts comparing the “active blockholders,” 13D, and the “passive blockholders,” 13G. He
reveals that the market does favor the filing of 13D more than it is for 13G; there is more
significant excess returns when a hedge fund files for 13D compared to 13G (Clifford, 2008).

IV(B). Opponents of Hedge Fund Activism
One of the biggest opponents of hedge fund activism is perhaps the renowned American
lawyer, and one of the founding partners of the law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
named Martin Lipton. There are many instances where Lipton openly criticizes the irresponsible
actions that activist hedge funds take on American firms. Amongst those criticisms, the blog
post on the Harvard Law School Forum, named “Important Questions about Activist Hedge
Funds,” is perhaps the most well-known criticism in the field that discredits the long term effects
that activist hedge funds bring to target firms. Lipton writes, “In what can only be considered a
form of extortion, activist hedge funds are prettying on American corporations to create shortterm increases in the market price of their stock at the expense of long-term value” (Important
Questions about Activist Hedge Funds, 2013). There are many questions that Lipton raised in
the blog that challenge the very fundamental premise and motive of hedge fund activism. One of
the questions is whether the so-called value creation that many scholars claim to be “statistically
significant” in their studies to be true, or merely value that got appropriate from other
stakeholders like employees or other investors of longer investment horizon like bondholders
(Important Questions about Activist Hedge Funds, 2013). Although Mr. Lipton did not provide
many regression analysis or data to support his argument, the concerns he raised in the blog is
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somewhat sobering; a lot of the empirical studies are too focused on the returns on stockholders
and that negates a lot of the spillover effects that hedge fund activism has on other stakeholders,
like employees. Lipton criticism does not stop there. In another blog post on the Harvard Law
School Forum, Lipton directs his argument to Professor Bebchuk that, “he must first put forth a
persuasive theory as to why the judgments as to corporate strategy and operations of short-termfocused professional money managers should take precedence over the judgments of directors
and executives charged with maximizing the long-term success of business enterprises” (Bite the
Apple; Poison the Apple, 2013). Even though Mr. Lipton’s argument is not as substantial in the
sense that it is not filled with econometric analysis and statistics, he raises important questions
that never got answered in previous studies. The revolving theme in many of Lipton’s argument
is that investors need to look at the bigger picture, but not just the excess returns and slight
improvement in the operating performance of the target firms.
There are also handful of studies that focus on how activist hedge funds are not value
creator in the long run. A report called “Activist hedge funds “creators of lasting wealth? What
do the empirical studies really say?,” written by Yvan Allaire and François Dauphin, openly
critiques on the study done by Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang. While Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang
conclude that there are lasting wealth creation effects from their empirical findings, Allaire and
Dauphin argue otherwise. One of the problems that Allaire and Dauphin point out in their report
is that econometric analysis can never “capture the nuances of every situation” (Allaire and
Dauphin, 2014, p. 6). Although Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang does address the question of causality
in their study, Allaire and Dauphin critiques that the improvements in operating performance
cannot be attributed to the interventions. In addition, Allaire and Dauphin point out that the
hedge funds were only engaged in their target firms for less than nine months, but to analyze the
operating performance in five years post-intervention is in no way meaningful. On the
appearance, this seems to be a good point that Allaire and Dauphin make; however, I personally
do not agree with this point they are trying to establish. The premise of hedge fund activism is
that hedge funds engage in target firms, implement changes and subsequently exit the investment
with the hopes of those changes will bring long-term improvements. Just because the hedge
funds are no longer active in target firms does not mean the long-term improvements cannot be
attributed to the interventions by hedge funds. That being said, Allaire and Dauphin do point out
some meaningful points from their assessment of the Bebchuk et al. paper. Although the results
are claimed to be “statistically significant,” which merely means the results are not zero, are the
results in any way significant in real life remains to be the question.
Following the report by Allaire and Dauphin, the empirical study, “The Impact of Hedge
Fund Activism on the Target Firm’s Existing Bondholders,” done by April Klein and Emanuel
Zur takes a closer look to the claim of activist hedge fund having significant wealth creation
effects. Much of the studies discussed previously focus on the supposedly wealth creation
effects on shareholders, and it is empirically proven that there is positive significant wealth
creation effects on shareholders. But this study specifically focuses on bondholders and the
conclusions are not consistent with what other scholars have found. Klein and Zur compile a set
of comprehensive data of corporate bonds for U.S. that are targeted by activist hedge funds
between 1994 to 2006. In short, they find that there was negative excess returns on bondholders
when hedge funds filed for the Schedule 13D and that the negative excess returns persist after a
year of the intervention. I find this study very interesting and groundbreaking in many ways.
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Not only is this the first literature that discusses the bondholders, which is of huge significance to
any companies’ capital structure, but that it also dismisses the claim of wealth creation. The
finding is consistent with the “proportionately large number of rating downgrades for the target
firm’s bonds, suggesting that the bond market both anticipates and reacts to the increase in
default risk” (Klein and Zur, 2011, 1736). If the firms are how the other authors claimed to have
significant increase in operating performance, shouldn’t the bond market react positively to that?
The negative impacts on bondholders not only disprove the claim of wealth creation but that it
shows how long term investors like bondholders value these activities in the long run. While
many studies previously have the underlying implication of hedge fund activism being a positive
sum game, it is simply not consistent with what we can see with losses the bondholders bear.
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Methodology
Since this study concerns with how different aspects of a hedge fund will impact the
target firms in the very short term through activism, whether it is a D or G, I have chosen to
include three independent variables namely, the size of the hedge fund at that time, the size of
the acquisition, and whether that acquisition is a D or G which will be captured by a dummy
variable with 1 denoting a 13D filing and 0 denoting a 13G filing. As for the dependent variable,
I chose to use cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as a proxy variable to gauge the short-term
price impacts of the intervention. In fact, the use of CAR to gauge the short-term impacts of
certain events is a common practice in the field of financial economics (add in literature). As
this dataset will neither be a time series nor a panel data, each event will be treated as a separate
event, resembling the framework of an event study 4. The concept of CAR will be discussed
more in-depth later in this paper.
I began this study by specifying the time period that I will use to collect data. Although
there is an abundance of data available online from databases like SEC EDGAR and SECInfo, I
chose to focus on the time period from 2010 to 2016 due to how the year of 2010 is viewed as
the start of a new era or a structural break for the economy, especially in the U.S., after the
global financial crisis in 2008. Therefore, incorporating the years during the crisis would not be
a prudent way to conduct this study as data maybe skewed or biased in certain ways that would
cloud the results. Afterwards, I proceeded by selecting the hedge funds I will be using to
identify the data or events. An event is defined as when a hedge fund takes on either an active or
passive stance, 13D or 13G respectively, at a target firm on a specific date. The events in this
study will only include the initial filing of either the 13D or 13G by hedge funds, the subsequent
amendments of the 13D or 13G, which is shown as 13D/A or 13G/A with “A” denoting
Amendment, will not be included in the dataset.
At this point, it is important to make note of the way I am selecting the scope of the
dataset. While it only seems logical to include every filing of 13D or 13G that was submitted to
the SEC from 2010 to 2016 by hedge funds, it is a task that is too time-consuming by itself. In
order to illustrate my point, I will first need to use the third party database called SECInfo 5 to
filter the 13D and 13G filings for the 5-year period. The 13D filing alone, for the 5-year period,
there are over 10,000 filings, which is very similar to 13G. The filings will then needed to go
through another manual filtering process to filter out all the events that were not filed by hedge
funds, but other financial intermediaries like pension funds or mutual funds. This is in fact the
way that was done in many literature discussed previously. The researchers will have to identify
which filers are hedge funds based on outside research and news. This is especially more
difficult due to how many hedge funds do not identify themselves as hedge funds but names like
investment management, or capital management etc. Due to the very time-consuming nature of
this task, I have decided to randomly select activist hedge funds based on various news sources
and use their names to filter out the relevant filings throughout the time period from 2010 to
2016. This is not to say that I do not acknowledge the tradeoff that comes with this particular
4

Event study is an empirical study performed to examine the effects of certain events that have led to an either
positive or negative impact on the value of the security in the very short run. (Investopedia, 2016)
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/eventstudy.asp
5
SECInfo:
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data sourcing method. Based on the news sources 6, I have selected 9 hedge funds of different
sizes, based on their AUM reported in the latest 13F filing, which I will go more in-depth later in
this paper. With the selected 9 hedge funds, I started collecting data by extensively using the
SECInfo database. While all the filings that are filed with the SEC are made available to the
public through the SEC EDGAR database, it is not necessary the most intuitive and user-friendly
database. SECInfo, on the other hand, does provide easier searches and better filters to enable
users to filter through the information they are seeking for.
After collecting all the relevant information from the filings, both 13D and 13G, from
1/1/2010 to 2/16/2016, there are in total 172 events. However, the data on one of the
independent variables, the size of the hedge fund, is not collected through the 13D and 13G
filings. In fact, the size of the hedge fund, determined by the asset under management (AUM), is
found in the 13F filings. It is a filing that is filed quarterly by any institutional fund or money
managers that have over $100 million USD worth of qualifying assets. Since it is filed quarterly,
the exact figure for AUM on the filing date of either the 13D or 13G is not known. The size of
the hedge fund around that filing date is approximated by taking the closest quarterly-reported
AUM figure. Take the case of Palo Alto Investors LLC for an example. Palo Alto Investors
LLC filed a 13G on the 16th of February, 2016. The AUM for Palo Alto Investors LLC around
that time will be taken from the figure reported through the 13F reported on the 31st of
December, 2015 (the fourth quarter of 2015).
As for the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), the dependent variable for this study,
requires a more sophisticated process to derive it. As the name suggests, CAR is a measure of
the sum of the abnormal returns, or excess returns, over a certain time period. While there are
many ways to compute CAR 7, I will use the simplest method, which is called the marketadjusted return model. Compared to the market model, one of the most common ways to
calculate CAR, “the market-adjusted return model can be viewed as a restricted market model”
(MacKinlay, 1997, p. 18). But before I can calculate the CAR for every event I have collected,
172 of them, I will need to determine the appropriate event window for the CAR. In short, the
event window is the days surrounding the event, the intervention of either a 13D or 13G in this
case, and by factoring the abnormal returns of both the days before and after the event, the CAR
can better gauge how the market reacts to the interventions induced by hedge funds. As I am
interested in the short-term price impacts of the interventions, I have chosen a 3-day event
window. Let t=0 be the date of the event. The date of the event is defined as the date when the
hedge funds filed the 13D or 13G with the SEC. This filing date should not be confused with
another date that is shown in all of the 13D or 13G filings, which is called “Date of Event Which
Requires Filing of this Statement.” As we recall from the previous literature, investors have a
buffer time to file either a 13D or 13G after they have acquired a 5% stake in a publicly traded
company; 10 days for 13D and 45 days for 13G.
The 3-day event window can be denoted as -1, 0, +1 with -1 being the trading day before
the event and +1 being the trading day after the event. It is important to note that they are
trading days but not just the day before the day of intervention. If the day before a particular
6
7

Three news sources include, hedgetracker, activistinsight, carriedin
The few common ways to compute the CAR include the constant mean return model, the market model, capital
asset pricing model (CAPM), and arbitrate pricing theory (APT)
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event is a Sunday or a holiday, then -1 is the closet trading before the event, which is a Friday
(assuming Friday is not a public holiday).
As the market model is given,
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1)
the market-adjusted return model assumes that the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 to be zero and the 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 to be one at all times.
Simply put, the market-adjusted return model basically measure the abnormal return of that
particular security by taking away the so-called normal return, yielded by the market on that
particular day. The abnormal return of that security of a particular target firm on a specific given
date will be,
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇 − 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑇𝑇 (2)
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇 is the return of a particular security during a day and 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀,𝑇𝑇 is the return of the market,
a particular index, during a day. Both the return of the security and the return of the market are
calculated the same way as follow:
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =

𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
× 100
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

As for the return of a particular security, or target firm’s stocks, I used both the Google
Finance and Yahoo Finance to collect the data on the asset prices on the respective 3-day event
window. At the same time, I have identified which stock exchange each of the target firm is
listed on, whether it is NASDAQ, NYSE or NYSEMKT. This is particularly important as
identifying which stock exchange each target firm is listed on provided me the basis on which
index, NASDAQ Composite, NYSE Composite, to collect data from to calculate the return of the
market.
The abnormal returns of the 3-day event window of each event, (-1, 0, +1), is calculated
for every single event. However, there are 23 events that I was unable to collect data on due to
how they were delisted from the stock exchange for numerous reasons. One of the main reasons
is that many of the target firms are acquired or merged with some other companies some time
after the interventions by the hedge funds and that they were no longer listed on the stock
exchange. This results in 149 events after excluding the 23 events that I was not able to collect
data on. This is in fact an issue that was extensively discussed in one of the literature that was
previously discussed. The empirical study, “The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism:
Productivity Asset Allocation, and Industry Concentration,” by Brav, Jiang, and Kim discuss
how previous research cannot address the problem of “survivorship bias in the post-intervention
period” (Brav et al., 2013, 2). Likewise in this study, it does suffer from the same problem as
firm-level data is non-existent in databases after they were taken off the database. Of the 172
events, there is approximately 13% of firms “disappeared,” which may potentially pose a
problem in my empirical results.
The next step is to calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), which is simply to
add up all of the abnormal returns on the 3-day event window across all 149 events over the 5year period. With that, the regression model for this study is as follow:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (3)
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where, CAR = Cumulative Abnormal Return (%)
active = dummy variable, 1 being a 13D, 0 being a 13G
size = the size of the acquisition by hedge funds (%)
aum = the size of the hedge fund (based on closest quarterly reported aum) in millions
For this study, I will be using Stata to execute all the statistical analysis.
Results
The results of the statistical analysis using the model above will be presented here. First,
Table 1 exhibits the descriptive statistics of the collected data.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the collected data

Variable Observations
CAR
149
active
149
size
149
aum
149

Mean
3.324161
0.3557047
8.230101
4105.192

Standard
Deviation
14.57633
0.4803409
3.84565
29.98

Min
-26.36
0
2.49
29.98

Max
107.89
1
34.61
19311.96

One of the first tests that I conducted in this study is running both a one-sample and twosample t-tests on the CAR. The one-sample t-test tested whether the CAR is statistically
different from zero. The null hypothesis for the one-sample t-test is: the mean for the CAR is 0.
As Table 2 shows, the p-value for the mean not equal to zero is 0.0061, which is far below the
alpha of 0.05. This means that the CAR for the 149 events is statistically different from zero at
the 5% level of significance. The p-value for the mean greater than zero is 0.0030, which
suggests that there is strong evidence that the CAR is greater than zero at the 5% level of
significance. The one-sample t-test does results that show how there are positive abnormal
returns on target firms on the 3-day event window.
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Table 2. One-sample t-test, Stata output
. ttest car==0
One-sample t test
Variable

Obs

Mean

car

149

3.324161

Std. Err.
1.19414

Std. Dev.

[95% Conf. Interval]

14.57633

.9643949

t =
degrees of freedom =

mean = mean(car)
Ho: mean = 0

Ha: mean != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0061

Ha: mean < 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9970

5.683927
2.7837
148

Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T > t) = 0.0030

As for the two-sample t-test, it is to test whether the mean of CAR by a 13D filing is
different from the mean of CAR by a 13G filing. This t-test is particularly important to this
study as this will indicate whether the market, or investors, do value a 13D and a 13G filing
differently. The null hypothesis for this two-sample t-test is: the mean of CAR by a 13D is the
same as the mean of CAR by a 13G. As Table 3 shows, the p-value for the alternative
hypothesis of the difference of two means equal to zero is 0.2088, which is greater than the
acceptable value of alpha of 0.05. The p-value of the other alternative hypothesis of the
difference of two means less than zero is 0.1044. Both of the results are above the alpha of 0.05
which means I failed to reject the null hypothesis that the null hypothesis. These results imply
that the mean CAR induced by a 13D filing is not statistically different than the mean CAR
induced by a 13G filing.
Table 3. Two-sample t-test, Stata output
Two-sample t test with unequal variances
Group

Obs

Mean

0
1

96
53

combined

149

diff

Std. Err.

Std. Dev.

[95% Conf. Interval]

2.175
5.40566

1.435684
2.111808

14.06678
15.37419

-.675194
1.168008

5.025194
9.643313

3.324161

1.19414

14.57633

.9643949

5.683927

-3.23066

2.55361

-8.297238

1.835917

diff = mean(0) - mean(1)
Ho: diff = 0
Ha: diff < 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.1044

t =
Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =
Ha: diff != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2088

-1.2651
99.5361

Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T > t) = 0.8956
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I applied a linear regression model to examine the relationships between the CAR and the
three independent variables, namely active, size and aum. Table 4 shows the results of the
regression analysis. To start with, the p-value of the f-statistic is 0.0616, acceptance level of
alpha = 0.05, shows that the overall model does not exhibit a strong overall significance. Similar
to t-tests, the f-test examines all the coefficients all at once and find the strength of the model.
Although this does not suggest an overall strength in the model, it is close to the desired
threshold. As for the R-squared, it is in a relatively low value of 0.0493 suggesting that the
regression line does not closely model the data collected. The R-squared value of 0.0493
suggests that the regression model only explains 4% of the data collected in the model. This is
potentially due to way the data was collected, which was discussed before. The fact that the 149
events are nowhere close to being exhaustive of all the events that took place between 2010 and
2016 is perhaps the problem that confounds the model and the R-squared value.
The coefficient values are the estimates of betas (𝛽𝛽) from the regression model. The
coefficient of the variable active, 2.926, with the p-value of 0.237 indicates that the coefficient is
not statistically significant. Same case goes to the variable size, with a coefficient of -0.093 with
a p-value of 0.765, indicating a very weak statistical significance. The coefficient of the variable
aum, 0.0007957, is the only coefficient that is significant at the 1% level, with the p-value of
0.017. This suggests that for every 1 million increase in the AUM of the hedge fund at a certain
time, there is approximately a 0.0008% increase in the CAR of that event.
Table 4. Regression, Stata output
. regress car active size aum
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

1548.89279
29896.5842

3
145

516.297597
206.18334

Total

31445.477

148

212.469439

car

Coef.

active
size
aum
_cons

2.926183
-.0925661
.0007957
-.2212481

Std. Err.
2.464738
.3091359
.0003309
3.150139

t
1.19
-0.30
2.40
-0.07

Number of obs
F(3, 145)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.237
0.765
0.017
0.944

=
=
=
=
=
=

149
2.50
0.0616
0.0493
0.0296
14.359

[95% Conf. Interval]
-1.945272
-.7035607
.0001416
-6.447371

7.797637
.5184284
.0014497
6.004875

To test for multicollinearity, I have conducted a test that test for multicollinearity, the
phenomenon that independent variables are highly correlated with each other. Table 5 shows
that the values for the variance inflation factor (VIF) are all significantly below the value of 5,
the acceptance level, which means that independent variables are not likely to be correlated to
one another.
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Table 5. Test for multicollinearity, stata output
. estat vif
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

size
aum
active

1.01
1.01
1.01

0.985720
0.987364
0.993920

Mean VIF

1.01

Discussion
The results have given us some insights regarding the short-term price impacts that hedge
funds induced. To start with, the one-sample t-test provided us the statistically significant results
about the CARs of the 3-day event period. This indicates that the interventions by hedge funds
do seem to induce positive abnormal short-term price shocks to the target firms. This finding is
very much in line with what other scholars have found in their studies. The study called “Value
creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists”, written by Christopher Clifford,
does seem to show similar results. In his study, with a 5-day event window, he uses a market
model return to compute the CARs. Not only was he able to find that there is positive abnormal
returns for both 13D and 13G filings that are statistically significant at the 1% level, with 13G
having significantly lower CARs than 13D, Clifford was able to find that the difference of CARs
between 13D and 13G is also statistically significant at the 5% level. The latter of Clifford’s
finding is what I was not able to find here in my study. While one of the factors, as discussed
previously, about not being able to find significance in the difference between the CARs induced
by 13D and 13G is due to the way the dataset was sampled, yet another potential factor is the
way the CAR was computed. Like many other literature, the conventional way to compute CAR
is by using the market model, which is stated in equation (1). The fact that I used a marketadjusted return model does seem to confound the results because the market-adjusted return
model does not take the volatility of the individual stock compared to the benchmark or index.
As for the regression model, two of the coefficients of the variable active and size are not
statistically significant but that there is still some to infer from the signs, whether it is positive or
negative, of the coefficients. As for the dummy variable, active, it is a positive coefficient,
which implies that the mean CARs induced by 13D filings would be approximately 3% higher
than it is for 13G filings. Although the p-value for this dummy variable is 0.237 which is far
from being statistically significant, the positive sign for the coefficient of the dummy shows that
the model does seem to show or exhibit a very general trend of how CARs are different, due to
13D or 13G, that is similar to previous literature. As for the coefficient for the aum, which has a
value of 0.0007957 that is significant at the 1% level, it implies that there is a positive
relationship between the AUM of the hedge fund and the magnitude of the CARs. To recall, the
coefficient of 0.0007957 means that for every 1 million increase in the AUM of the hedge fund,
there is approximately 0.0008% increase in the mean CARs. One explanation for this
phenomenon is that investors value the effort of larger hedge funds on target firms, which is
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subsequently reflected in the higher price, a higher mea CAR from the 3-day event window. At
the same time, this coefficient can be better explained in a different way. Rather than
speculating this is the result of investors pricing in the information of the size of the hedge fund,
it can be potentially due to how bigger hedge funds have larger pools of capital to take on bigger
stakes in the target firms, driving up the price following the event date.
Although the coefficients from the regression do not provide many insightful points about
how different determinants of each intervention, the fact that the coefficients are “not
meaningful” say something about how the market view these interventions. As there are no
obvious relationships between the dummy variable of whether it is a 13D or 13G, the size of the
acquisition, can imply that the market, or investors, does not view these variables as important
determinants. This, coupled with the fact that the t-test shows that the CARs are statistically
different than zero at the 1% level of significance, shows that the market does view these
interventions as positive signals, as reflected in the positive abnormal returns, but the market is
not concerned with the details of the intervention. Whether it is a 10% or 5% acquisition of a
target firm does not influence how the market reacts towards that event.
Also, the fact that there is CAR during the 3-day event window suggests that the market
is in a weak form according to the Efficient-market hypothesis.
- elaborate on how this can relate to the efficient market hypothesis

Conclusion
The results of this study does seem to support the existing body of literature; the
interventions do induce positive price shocks in the market. While this is true, the latter part of
the study, which is to investigate the determinants that drive the CARs, does not yield significant
results. Only one of the three independent variables shows statistical significance after the
regression. Although this is the case, some inferences can be made from these seemingly
insignificant results. First, we can infer that the market does price in these interventions, as seen
with those positive price shocks, but that the market does not care the underlying details
regarding the intervention. Second, by seeing this positive price shocks, we can see that our
market is in a weak form, according to the efficient-market hypothesis, as semi-strong and strong
form are not supposed to have abnormal returns.
This study can be furthered by expanding the dataset while adding more possible
determinants of the CARs.
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